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Summary 
Illegal logging is widely recognized as a major economic problem and one of the causes of 
environmental degradation. Increasing awareness of its negative effects has fostered a wide 
range of proposals to combat it by major international conservation groups and political 
organizations. Following the 2008 US legislation which prohibits the import of illegally 
harvested wood and wood products, the European Union (EU) is now discussing a 
legislation proposal which would ban illegal timber from the EU market. In this study we use 
the ICES computable general equilibrium model to estimate the reallocation of global 
demand and timber imports following the pending EU legislation. With this exercise our 
final objective is to assess the economic impacts and measure the potential emission 
reduction resulting from the introduction of this type of policy. Results show that while the 
EU ban does not seem particularly effective in reducing illegal logging activities, its main 
effect will be the removal of illegal logs from the international markets. In addition, the 
unilateral EU ban on illegal logs increases secondary wood production in illegal logging 
countries as their exports become relatively more competitive. Through this mechanism, part 
of the banned, illegal timber will re-enter the international trade flows, but it will be 
“hidden” as processed wood. This effect is, however, limited. Finally, given the limited effect 
on overall economic activity, effects on GHG emissions are also limited. Direct carbon 
emissions from logging activities can decrease from 2.5 to 0.6 million tons per year. 
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The economic and environmental effects of an EU  
ban on illegal logging imports. 








Illegal logging is widely recognized as a major economic problem and one of the causes of 
environmental degradation. Increasing awareness of its negative effects has fostered a wide range 
of proposals to combat it by major international conservation groups and political organizations. 
Following the 2008 US legislation which prohibits the import of illegally harvested wood and wood 
products, the European Union (EU) is now discussing a legislation proposal which would ban 
illegal timber from the EU market. In this study we use the ICES computable general equilibrium 
model to estimate the reallocation of global demand and timber imports following the pending EU 
legislation. With this exercise our final objective is to assess the economic impacts and measure the 
potential emission reduction resulting from the introduction of this type of policy. 
Results show that while the EU ban does not seem particularly effective in reducing illegal logging 
activities, its main effect will be the removal of illegal logs from the international markets. In 
addition, the unilateral EU ban on illegal logs increase secondary wood production in illegal 
logging countries as their exports become relatively more competitive. Through this mechanism, 
part of the banned, illegal timber will re-enter the international trade flows, but it will be “hidden” 
as processed wood. This effect is, however, limited. 
Finally, given the limited effect on overall economic activity, effects on GHG emissions are also 
limited. Direct carbon emissions from logging activities can decrease from 2.5 to 0.6 million tons 
per year. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Illegal logging is widely recognized as a major economic problem and one of the causes of 
environmental degradation, taking place in important biodiversity hot spot areas, depleting 
forest bases and placing stress on the remaining intact forest sites. In fact, forests are amongst 
the richest biological systems on earth, containing almost 90% of the total terrestrial 
biodiversity, therefore holding a major plant and animal natural genetic bank. Continued illegal 
logging activities seriously endanger this biological wealth creating irreversible losses, such as 
the extinction of potential plants for medicinal use. In addition, forests also prevent soil erosion 
and regulate water services, and as a result, high deforestation rates may have long-term 
negative effects on agricultural production and local water supplies. 
Forests play a major role in the world carbon cycle, regulating climate by stocking and 
releasing CO2 back into the atmosphere. In fact, currently circa 1 trillion metric tons of CO2 are 
stocked in wood biomass, while this number increases to three or four times when it is also 
considered below ground carbon (UN FAO, 2006). On the other hand, deforestation is the 
second main cause of global anthropogenic greenhouse (GHG’s) emissions, accounting for 
around 17% of total annual atmospheric carbon release (IPCC 2007).  
Against this background, illegal logging must surely be associated to deforestation. The role it 
plays in this process, however, is still not clear. Some studies appoint illegal logging as the main 
cause of deforestation (Indufor 2008), others however, have identified agricultural land 
conversion as the major force behind deforestation rates (Geist and Lambin 2001).
1 Moreover, 
forest clearance driven by agriculture is associated with larger emissions than illegal logging, as 
in the latter case timber may be used in long-term carbon storage products such as furniture or 
construction, implying that a major part of carbon remains stocked in wood biomass.  
Finally, illegal logging activities also create important social and economic problems. It often 
negatively affects communities and rural livelihoods, generates gross government revenue 
losses, promotes corruption and compromises sustainable forest management. Forests are indeed 
a critical natural resource for millions of rural poor, providing essential gathering, hunting and 
fuelwood products. Moreover, forests are an important cultural and social asset in many areas of 
the world. Illegal logging reduces government revenues from some of the poorest countries in 
the world due to tax evasion and royalties on legally sanctioned timber. According to a World 
                                                 
1 Wood extraction can also be associated with agricultural expansion, making it harder to individually identify what 
drives deforestation rates.   3
Bank study (World Bank 2006), this amounts to around U$5 billion per year. Finally, and 
perhaps more importantly, illegally logged timber decreases timber prices on international 
markets, undermining sustainable forest management practice efforts. 
Occasionally, illegal logging has also been considered as an economic source for the poor, 
generating employment in harvesting operations. These benefits however, do typically tend to 
be temporary, as the illegally logged areas are unsustainably exploited over a few years and then 
abandoned.  
Increasing awareness of these negative effects has fostered a wide range of proposals in order 
to combat illegal logging by major international conservation groups and international political 
organizations. The first official statement on this issue took place at the G8 summit in 
Birmingham in 1998, when the present foreign ministers agreed on an ‘Action Programme on 
Forests’ which explicitly mentioned illegal logging. Following this demonstration of 
international political will to tackle the illegal logging question, the 2003 EU’s Action Plan on 
Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) has been at the centre of 
international attempts to control the world timber products trade. Under this system producer 
countries negotiate Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPA) expressing the details of a 
licensing scheme and setting out the capacity-building assistance to be offered by the European 
Union. While the FLEG-VPA system has the main advantage of creating a mechanism which 
makes it possible to distinguish between legal and illegal timber, the vast majority of the world 
timber trade remains uncovered. Conscious of this major drawback the US and the EU have 
considered more comprehensive policy instruments to ban illegal timber products from their 
internal markets. In this context, following the 2008 US legislation which prohibits the import 
of illegally harvested wood and wood products, the European Union (EU) is now discussing a 
legislation proposal on banning illegal timber from the EU market. 
While the momentum for international action on illegal logging is increasing, it has been 
argued that policies targeting international trade are not appropriate instruments to tackle the 
illegal logging issue. The main criticism to this type of measure is based on the fact that most 
illegal logging activities tend to be poverty driven or low-level subsistence oriented. In fact, up 
to 80% of total felled roundwood in tropical areas is consumed as fuelwood, while only 2% of 
total fuelwood production is traded on international markets.  While this type of criticism is 
indeed valid, it is also true that many commercial enterprises benefit from illegal activities, 
enjoying higher profits and evading taxation that could otherwise be used by national 
governments to implement development/economic growth programs. In addition, commercial 
enterprises are known to have organised rural populations to practice illegal logging in   4
compensation for low value payments. Actions at an international level will therefore close 
international markets to these types of timber, reducing incentives for enterprises to engage in 
this type of activity (Brack et al 2002). 
In this study we use the ICES computable general equilibrium model to estimate the 
reallocation of global demand and imports of timber following the pending EU legislation on 
banning illegal timber from the EU market. This would follow the 2008 US legislation which 
prohibits the import of illegally harvested wood and wood products (the Combat Illegal Logging 
Act). With this exercise our final objective is to assess the economic impacts and measure the 
potential emission reduction resulting from the introduction of this type of policy. 
This report is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the relevant economic literature on this 
topic. Section 3 presents the model, the methodology used to impose a ban on illegal logging by 
the European Union and describes used illegal logging data. Section 4 presents the simulation 
results while in section 5 a discussion is provided. Section 6 concludes the report. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
A series of reports on illegal logging are already available. These have identified the main 
impacts resulting from continued illegal logging activities, the scope of the problem as well as 
its role in international timber markets and finally, presents different options in order to combat 
illegal logging (Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2007, Brack et al 2001, Brack et al 2002). 
While the number of these reports is relatively large, economic data and literature dealing with 
illegal logging is still scarce. A study commissioned by the American Forest & Paper 
Association to the Seneca Creek Associates LLC and Wood Resources International LLC 
(Seneca Creek Associates 2004) analyzed the effects of alleged illegal forest activity on U.S. 
exporters in non-USA markets. The main objectives of this study were: to provide a perspective 
and context on the issue of illegal logging from the standpoint of global production and trading 
patterns; assessing the impacts of illegally produced and traded wood products on the ability of 
U.S. producers to export into key overseas markets; and, finally, review the various institutional 
and government initiatives that have been proffered to address illegal logging, paying particular 
attention to potential implications for the U.S. wood products trade. Using two partial 
equilibrium economic models, the Global Forest Products Model (GFPM) and the Radiata Pine 
Market Model (RPMM), a study focused on New Zealand (Turner et al 2007), determined the 
production, trade and price effects of international trade distortions due to illegal logging, 
considering the effect of illegal logging on both the price and competitiveness of New Zealand   5
wood products. This study concluded that the elimination of illegal logging lead to significant 
increases in the price and production of wood products in almost all countries without illegal 
logging activities. Moreover, illegal logging potentially lowered investments in forest 
development, resulting in higher carbon liabilities for countries such as New Zealand.  
  More recently, a paper using the same GFPM (Li et al 2008) aimed to assess the economic 
impacts on forest industries by predicting how markets would react to a worldwide elimination 
of illegal logging over five years. While it concluded that substantial differences in the effects 
across countries would occur, the impact on wood product prices, production and trade were 
estimated to be modest. In fact, impact on world prices varied between 2 to 4% depending on 
the product, and industrial world roundwood production decreased by 1 to 0.5% depending on 
the assumed illegal logging scenario. 
  Finally, and closely related to the present study, a recent report has been produced with the 
main objective to help the European Commission in formulating its policy options aimed at 
banning illegal timber and timber products on the EU market (Indufor 2008). The study 
concludes that the final effects will depend on the implemented policy, pointing out major 
advantages and drawbacks resulting from different policy instruments. It is possible to state, 
however, that in general a decline in production volume is compensated with higher product 
prices. Some qualitative considerations on environmental impacts are also presented; no 
quantitative consequences on carbon emission reductions from deforestation are performed. 
  Our report uses the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model ICES to estimate the 
reallocation of global demand and imports of timber following the EU legislation on banning 
illegal logging. The use of a CGE model is particularly appropriate in highlighting worldwide 
supply and demand re-composition induced by changing prices in the timber market triggered 
by import restrictions. A CGE model represents national economies as a system of markets 
interconnected by domestic and international flows of input, goods and services and 
accordingly, it is particularly apt to describe substitution and transmission mechanisms induced 
by a given policy shock. On the other hand, it must be recognized that many complexities of 
illegal economy, and most importantly its interaction with the legal economy, cannot be 
captured. The main goal of the proposed exercise is thus, to provide a first qualitative 
description of potential effects in the international timber market and of the possible order of 
magnitude regarding feedback on income flows and CO2 emissions. 
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3.  Data and Methodology  
3.1 Illegal logging and the industrial roundwood market 
 
Industrial roundwood production is concentrated in three main regions/countries (see Table 1); 
the United States of America alone was responsible for approximately 25% of world production 
in 2004, while Canada ranked second. If considered as a whole, the European Union 27 is also 
one of the major roundwood production areas in the world, representing 20% of global 
production. Considered together, these three areas are responsible for 67% of total production. 
Accordingly, countries where illegal logging activities are a major problem, account for a much 
smaller fraction. Among these, Russia, Brazil China, Indonesia and Malaysia register the 
highest production levels. Together they produce 24% of global industrial roundwood 
(FAOSTAT).  
 
Table 1. Major industrial roundwood producers in 2004 
 (% = country m
3 production/world m
3 production) 
United States of America  25,23% 
European Union 27  20,60% 
Canada 12,39% 








South Africa  1,29% 















Some of the main industrial roundwood producers play a less substantial role in world exports. 
In 2004, large roundwood producers such as the United States of America, Canada, China, 
Brazil, and Indonesia, exported 2.49%, 1.90% 0.75%, 0.34% and 2.88% of their total   7
production, respectively. Russia, therefore, was the world largest exporter in 2004, representing 
almost 35% of total world exports (see Table 2). The European Union 27 ranks second in the 
list, accounting for 26% of roundwood exports. With the exception of Russia, all other major 
illegal logging countries play a minor role in international markets, Malaysia for example, 
represents 4.6% of total world exports, while Indonesia, Myanmar and Brazil account for just 
1.23%, 0.78% and 0.3%. From these, Myanmar and Malaysia alone export a significant part of 
their national industrial roundwood production, 35.18% and 21.53%, respectively (FAOSTAT). 
 
 
Table 2. Major industrial roundwood exporters in 2004 
(% = country m
3 exports/world m
3 exports)   
  Russian Federation  34,75%   
  European Union 27  25,99%   
  United States of America  8,70%   
  Malaysia 4,56%   
  New Zealand  4,38%   
  Canada 3,26%   
  Czech Republic  2,39%   
  Ukraine 2,18%   
  Papua New Guinea  1,69%   
  Switzerland 1,46%   
  Gabon 1,44%   
  Uruguay 1,35%   
  Myanmar 1,23%   
  Belarus 1,21%   
  Australia 0,88%   
  Solomon Islands  0,85%   
  Indonesia 0,78%   
  Congo 0,71%   
  China 0,59%   
  Equatorial Guinea  0,57%   
  Croatia 0,33%   
  South Africa  0,31%   
  Central African Republic  0,30%   
  Brazil 0,30%   
Source: FAOSTAT 
 
The European Union is the world’s largest roundwood importer (44.3%) followed by China 
(22.58%) and Japan (10.36%) (see Table 3). Given the aim of the present study, it is particularly 
relevant to identify the major European Union suppliers. As detailed data on international 
bilateral trade is hard to obtain, we rely on our initial model database (Narayanan and Walmsley 
2008). Accordingly, we find that Africa and Russia are the main sources of European 
roundwood imports. European imports from Russia are mainly destined to Finland. A recent 
study (Indufor 2008) confirms these figures, also identifying Russia as Europe’s major supplier 
while African countries’ exports are mainly addressed towards Europe. 
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Table 3. Major industrial roundwood importers in 2004  
(%  = country m
3 imports/world m
3 imports) 
European Union 27  44,30% 
China 22,58% 
Japan 10,36% 




United States of America  1,99% 
Turkey 1,44% 











    Source: FAOSTAT 
 
We may, therefore, conclude that while for some countries illegal logging represents a major 
share of national production, it plays a minor role in international trade. Note, however, that 
illegal timber may also enter international markets through secondary wood products. While the 
scope of this analysis is restricted to a ban on illegal logging, we also consider the effects on 
other timber producing sectors when discussing final results. 
 
3.2 Illegal logging shares 
 
Given the nature of the problem, illegal logging estimates are very hard to calculate and are 
therefore a contentious issue. The controversy starts at its definition as a universal consensus 
does not exist and legality changes across countries and institutions. In fact, reports on illegal 
logging rates provided by NGO’s and national governments tend to provide rather disparate 
conclusions. While government institutions’ figures concentrate on officially sanctioned logging 
operations, NGO’s usually consider sustainability and the attribution of logging permissions, 
among other criteria. 
The broadest and most widely used study on illegal logging rates today remains the Seneca 
Creek study commissioned by the American Forest & Paper Association (Seneca Creek 
Associates 2004). More recently, a new study (Li et al 2008) building upon the Seneca Creek   9
2004 data provided a comprehensive number of estimates of illegal production, integrated with 
other report calculations.  
Our study makes direct use of these figures. Note, however, that due to lack of data we are 
directly applying to imports a restriction based on estimates on illegal timber production. The 
assumption is that the share of illegal products in production translates directly on export. In 
general, however, illegal product shares tend to be higher in export than in production (Indufor 
2008). To account for this we consider the upper level estimates provided in the aforementioned 
study.  
To adjust the original data to the regional aggregation used in this study, we recalculate illegal 
logging shares, weighting it after industrial roundwood production from the various countries 
contained in the corresponding macro regions (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Illegal logging data 
Region  Illegal Logging rate 
1 Oceania  3%
2 XAsia  21%
3 Japan  0%
4 China  50%
5 Indonesia  80%
6 Myanmar  80%
7 Malaysia  33%
8 India  10%
9 CAN_XNA  0%
10 USA  0%
11 LACA  12%
12 Brazil  80%
13 EU  3%
14 EST_LTV  30%
15 Finland  0%
16 XEUR  5%
17 Russia  30%
18 AFRICA  21%
 
3.3  Modeling framework 
 
In order to assess the consequences of the EU ban on imports of illegal logging, this study 
adopts a general equilibrium perspective. The main strength of this approach is the explicit 
representation of international and intersectoral trade flows. Goods, services and factors of 
production are indeed mobile between sectors and countries, responding to scarcity signals 
provided by changes in relative prices. Therefore, when the final implications on the GDP from 
each of the economies under investigation, having been induced by some “perturbation” ( in our 
case an import restriction), are provided, “market, social-economic adaptation” is taken into   10
consideration i.e., all the adjustments at work in the economic system which are able to smooth 
or amplify the initial impact are analyzed. 
Another interesting feature of general equilibrium modelling is the possibility to highlight 
consequences not only for the economy as a whole (typical indicator in this sense is GDP), but 
also for each sector represented. 
This study uses ICES, a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model developed at FEEM. It 
is a recursive-dynamic and extended version of the GTAP-E model (Burniaux and Truong, 
2002), which includes CO2 emissions related to fossil fuel use.  
Table 5 presents the selected regional and sectoral aggregation used for this study. The regional 
detail singles out those areas where illegal logging is a major economic and environmental 
concern. At the same time, it explicitly identifies the major actors in the world timber trade. The 
sectoral detail emphasizes the logging industry together with those where timber, raw or 
processed, is a major production factor (i.e. lumber, paper and construction). Other industries 
are aggregated into 10 macro-sectors for the sake of simplicity. 








Estonia Latvia (EST_LTV)  Oil 
Africa Gas 
Rest of Asia (XAsia)  Oil_Pcts 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LACA)  Electricity 
India Logging 
Rest of Europe (XEUR)  Lumber 
European Union* (EU)  Paper 
Oceania Construction 
Canada and Rest of North America (CAN_XNA) 
Finland 
Japan 
USA   
* Does not include, Finland, Estonia and Latvia 
 
The emission module of the model has been enriched by emissions from avoided deforestation 
relying on data published in the last Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005 (FAO 2006). In 
using this data it is possible to estimate national carbon averages of stored above-ground 
biomass per cubic meter of wood and, therefore, calculate the reduction in forest carbon stock as 
a direct result from logging activities (see Table 6). In addition, to account for the fact that 
clearances in commercial forest plantations are usually compensated through re-plantation, we   11
adjust emissions to account for logging associated with primary forests alone.  For this last step 
we use collected data from Brown (2000).  
Finally, one should note that at the time of harvesting a significant fraction of carbon previously 
retained in woody biomass may remain stocked in wood products, which means that emissions 
do not take place immediately. Therefore, to correctly account for the time path of these carbon 
emissions it would be necessary to have a complete description of the wood product cycle. 
Unfortunately, this type of information is still not available on a global scale. Taking this into 
consideration we perform a sensitivity analysis on the amount of timber that is used in long-
term storage structures (e.g. construction). In this case, if for example, 75% of harvested timber 
is used in long-term storage structures, this means that only the remaining 25% will eventually 
be destroyed in the short run. Accordingly, we may estimate the amount of carbon emissions 
resulting from illegal logging activities by assuming that 25% of carbon stocked in woody 
biomass is released when harvesting occurs. 
Table 6 – Data for forest carbon release calculations 




Oceania 36  35 
XAsia 63  76 
Japan 61  171 
China 23  67 
Indonesia 50  59 
Myanmar 79  85 
Malaysia 136 251 
India 27  69 
CAN_XNA -  106 
USA 52  116 
LACA 90  101 
Brazil 81  170 
EU 61  166 
EST_LTV 59  201 
Finland 30  96 
XEUR 61  174 
Russia 32  100 
AFRICA 73 94 
 
The ban on illegal logging is implemented through an import tariff which reduces EU log 
imports until demand directed to each exporter meets exactly their legal log supply. The 
presence of the tariff, is however, just an artifice to replicate the desired quota restriction. It 
raises the problem of the revenues which, in the quota case, do not exist. In the model they are 
rebated lump sums to households by default, this however, would imply an excessive burden on 
EU log importers and perhaps an unrealistic gain to households. Thus to remove this distortion 
the tariff paid is not refunded to households, but to importers.    12
Final important disclaimers are as follows: 
Although the model is recursive-dynamic, we use it in its static fashion. The aim of this exercise 
is indeed to highlight transmission mechanisms and possible feedback effects, rather than to 
study long-term dynamics. In order to do this, it is preferable to base the assessment on the 
verified historical data and parameterization of the calibration year (2004) and to avoid 
uncertain projections. 
Secondly, due to the lack of data, the model does not represent as separate and different the 
legal and illegal timber production/market. This has many consequences.  
Firstly, it is assumed that the timber export composition of legal and illegal logs from an illegal 
logging country is the same irrespective of the importer and is equal to the share of illegal 
logging over total logging production. It is also assumed that there is no difference in legal and 
illegal components between timber directed to the domestic or international market.  
By the same token, at least where domestic production is concerned, timber is treated as an 
undifferentiated good composed of a given share of legal and illegal products, it is therefore, 
impossible to describe the re-composition between legal and illegal activity induced by the EU 
ban. What can be derived, however, is the impact on total domestic timber production due to the 
ban and through this it is possible to make some inference on illegal activity. 
Nevertheless, as long as imports/exports are concerned, it is assumed that the ban is 100% 
effective in tackling illegal exports (perfect traceability of illegal timber).  
 
4.  Results 
 
In this section we discuss the results of a European Union ban on illegal logging following the 
methodology described in the previous section. In particular, we focus our analysis on trade 
flows, production and prices in “wood dependent” sectors and effects on Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). Finally, we assess the impact of this type of policy in Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions for the main illegal logging countries. 
 
4.1 Trade flows 
Table 7 extensively reports the effect of the EU ban on timber from illegal logging activities on 
world import/export volumes in the timber markets. Figures 1 and 2 provide a snapshot for the 
EU. 
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Table 7. Changes in timber import (columns to row)/ export (rows to columns) flows following the EU ban on timber from illegal logging activities 
(1) (2)    Oceania  XAsia  Japan  China  Indonesia  Myanmar  Malaysia  India CAN_XNA USA  LACA Brazil  EU EST_LTV Finland  XEUR Russia  AFRICA 
2.9 5  Oceania -0.001  -0.051  -0.021 -0.052  0.007  -0.269  -0.237 -0.155  0.007  0.005 -0.003 0.000 -2.9  -2.9  -2.9 -0.009  -0.018  -0.062 
21.1  11  XAsia  0.002 -0.048 -0.018 -0.049  0.010  -0.266  -0.234 -0.152  0.010  0.008 0.000 0.003 -21.1  -21.1  -21.1 -0.006  -0.016 -0.059 
 18  Japan  -0.003  -0.053  0  -0.053  0.006  -0.271  -0.239  -0.157  0.006  0.004  -0.005  -0.001  14.8  55.2  73.0  -0.010  -0.020  -0.064 
50.0  14* China  0.001  -0.049 -0.019  0  0.009  -0.267  -0.235  -0.153  0.009  0.007 -0.001 0.003 -50.0  -50.0  -50.0 -0.007  -0.016 -0.060 
80.0  15* Indonesia  0.008 -0.041 -0.011 -0.042  0  -0.258  -0.227 -0.145  0.017  0.015 0.007 0.010 -80.0  -80.0  -80.0 0.001  -0.008 -0.052 
80.0  9*  Myanmar  0.967  0.806  0.841  0.790  0.903  0  0.584  0.686  0.889  0.955 0.946 0.969 -80.0  -80.0  -80.0 0.862  0.950  0.827 
33.0  6*  Malaysia  0.002 -0.048 -0.018 -0.049  0.010  -0.266  0  -0.153  0.010  0.009 0.000 0.004 -33.0  -33.0  -33.0 -0.005  -0.015 -0.059 
10.0  13  India  0.003 -0.047 -0.017 -0.047  0.011  -0.265  -0.233  0  0.011  0.009 0.000 0.004 -10.0  -10.0  -10.0 -0.005  -0.014 -0.058 
 7  CAN_XNA -0.005  -0.055  -0.025  -0.056  0.003  -0.274  -0.241  -0.159  0.004  0.001  -0.007  -0.004  14.8  55.2  73.0  -0.013  -0.023  -0.066 
 3  USA  -0.007  -0.057  -0.026  -0.057  0.002  -0.275  -0.243  -0.161  0.002 0  -0.009  -0.005  14.8  55.2  73.0  -0.014  -0.024  -0.068 
11.9  10  LACA  0.004 -0.047 -0.016 -0.047  0.012  -0.264  -0.232 -0.151  0.012  0.010 0.001 0.004 -11.9  -11.9  -11.9 -0.005  -0.014 -0.058 
80.0 17*  Brazil  0.006 -0.044  -0.014  -0.045 0.015  -0.262  -0.230  -0.149  0.014  0.012  0.003  0  -80.0  -80.0  -80.0  -0.002  -0.012  -0.055 
3.2  1  EU  -0.059  -0.111  -0.078  -0.111  -0.052  -0.330  -0.295  -0.212  -0.052  -0.054 -0.064 -0.061  -3.2  -3.2  -3.2  -0.069  -0.076  -0.120 
29.5  12  EST_LTV  0.255  0.197  0.241  0.210  0.269  -0.008  0.024  0.105  0.252  0.241 0.251 0.262 -29.5  -29.5  -29.5 0.223  0.236  0.180 
  16  Finland  -0.566  -0.556  -0.525  -0.611  -0.558  -0.833  -0.801  -0.709  -0.552  -0.509 -0.563 -0.565  14.1  54.5  0  -0.538  -0.581  -0.578 
5.0  8  XEUR  0.003 -0.047 -0.016 -0.047  0.012  -0.265  -0.233 -0.151  0.012  0.010 0.001 0.005 -5.0  -5.0  -5.0 -0.005  -0.014 -0.058 
30.0  2*  Russia  0.151  0.087  0.118  0.086  0.160  -0.117  -0.085 -0.024  0.155  0.139 0.140 0.153 -30.0  -30.0  -30.0 0.128  0  0.078 
21.4  4*  AFRICA  0.066  0.011  0.044  0.009  0.073  -0.201  -0.172 -0.095  0.075  0.072 0.061 0.068 -21.4  -21.4  -21.4 0.053  0.050  0 
(1) % of illegal over total logging activities 
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Numbers before region names are their rank in timber exports
*: illegal logging > 21.4 % of total logging activity
 
 

































Numbers before region names are their rank in timber exports
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Numbers before region names are their rank in timber exports
 
Note. EU excludes Estonia, Latvia and Finland 
 































Numbers before region names are their rank in timber exports
 
The EU ban reduces timber exports from illegal loggers to the EU by -21% from Africa to -80% 
from Myanmar, Indonesia and Brazil (see Figure 1). In absolute money terms, the higher export 
contractions to the EU are experienced by Russia (-238 US $ million) and Africa (-122 US $ 
million) which are the main EU timber trading partners (Figure 2). All illegal logging regions 
compensate the ban by increasing their timber exports to non EU countries and often timber use 
in the domestic market (see Table 7). At the same time, the ban increases (on average by 
roughly 14%) EU timber demand addressed towards the legal producers. This is met by a 
uniform and proportional increase in exports primarily from the USA, Canada and North 
America, Japan and Finland (Figure 3 and 4). The ban also fosters EU domestic logging 
production which increases by 1.3% (Figure 7).    16
The net reshuffling effect on timber import/export flows is relevant: in illegal logging prone 
regions total timber exports contract by -40% in Brazil to -8% in Indonesia. In “legal logger 
regions” they increase by 2.3% to 11%  in the USA and Finland, respectively (Figure 5). 
Total EU timber demand on international markets contracts roughly by -9% (in Estonia and 
Latvia, and Finland -25% and -27.7%, respectively – see figure 6). Imports in all the other 
regions are, however, scarcely affected. This confirms that a unilaterally imposed ban by the EU 
has mainly an EU relevance. 
 




















































Note: EU excludes Estonia, Latvia and Finland 
 
 







































Note: EU excludes Estonia, Latvia and Finland   17
4.2 Impacts on wood product sectors 
 
Exporters hit by the ban, decrease their timber production, but by much less than the drop in 
imports. This depends on the possibility to sell timber domestically and on the fact that exports 
are usually a minor share of total production. The opposite happens in regions where logging 
activities are mainly legal (see Figure 7). 
Higher percentage contractions are thus experienced by Estonia and Latvia (-7%), Russia (-
3.8%) and Africa (-1.26%). The latter two areas have more intense timber trade flows with 
Europe. These are followed by Myanmar (-2.2%) and Brazil (-1%). On the contrary, Finland, 
the EU and USA expand logging by 5%, 1.3%, 0.2%, respectively.  



















































Note: EU excludes Estonia, Latvia and Finland 
 
Globally, contractions and expansions in logging activities almost perfectly compensate each 
other. This leaves world raw timber production (see Figure 8) and prices (see Figure 9) almost 
unaffected: they both increase, but marginally so (0.08% and 0.002%, respectively). The effect 
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In terms of value-added (see figure 10), the EU ban clearly favours logging activities from legal 
producers, primarily within the EU (where the gain can be quantified in 584.6 US$ Million), 
followed by the USA, the rest of North America and marginally, Japan. It penalizes the logging 
activities in regions where illegal logging is widespread, especially those where the EU is the 
main export destination i.e. Russia (-235 US$ Million) and Africa (-124 US$ Million). 
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Summarizing, the results so far obtained allows us to derive 
conclusion 1: “the (unilateral) EU ban has the main effect of removing illegally logged timber 
from the international market (as witnessed by the contraction in exports from illegal loggers), 
but it is not really effective in reducing illegal logging activities (much smaller contraction in 
logging activities)” 
conclusion 2: “the (unilateral) EU ban has a (moderately) positive effect on logging industries 
in legal logging regions (especially the EU) as their production increases together with prices. 
Conversely, the ban damages logging industries in illegal logging regions” 
As shown, the size of quantity and price effects on production in the logging industry are rather 
modest.  This being the industry more directly affected by the ban. Accordingly, smaller 
impacts can be expected in those sectors using raw timber as a direct intermediate input such as 
lumber (which is a timber processing industry), and those higher up in the production chain, 
such as paper and construction, both of which are only indirectly hit by the EU policy. The 
negligible global and regional effects on lumber and paper production are indeed highlighted in 
Figure 11




                                                 
2 Construction is omitted as impacts on sectoral production are basically zero.   20
 
 













































































































































Note: EU excludes Estonia, Latvia and Finland 
 




























































































































































Note: EU excludes Estonia, Latvia and Finland 
 
These latter results allow us to draw the following 
conclusion 3: “the (unilateral) EU ban has an effect which is mainly circumscribed to the 
logging sectors and the logging market; in general it affects the activity and income of other 
wood dependent sectors only marginally.”   21
However, Figures 11 and 12 also convey other important information.  
Illegal loggers, primarily Myanmar and Russia - and within the EU, Estonia and Lithuania - are 
increasing lumber and paper production. A similar pattern can be observed in their exports (see 
Figure 13). 
 






























































































































































































Essentially, in illegal logging countries there is an excess supply of raw timber (logs) which 
cannot be sold abroad. Therefore, this becomes a cheaper intermediate input for domestic 
lumber and paper industries which can increase production and exports.  
This leads to  
conclusion 4: “the (unilateral) EU ban also has the effect of stimulating secondary wood 
products in illegal logging countries and, through this mechanism,  part of the banned illegal 
timber will remain in the international trade flows, but will be “hidden” as processed wood.”  
This is a kind of pervasive effect as all illegal logging countries increase their exports of 
secondary wood products. This increase is, however, rather small. Therefore, while illegal 
timber  may still enter international markets through this channel it would seem that they do not 
compensate a reduction in log flows, and conclusion 1 is, therefore, still valid
3.  
                                                 
3 This conclusion is also indirectly supported by analyzing Figure 10 which shows the effects on value-added of 
secondary wood products sectors are positive, even though very small.   22
The final effect of the EU ban on secondary wood products in legal logging countries depends 
on trade relationships. Surely all their paper and lumber industries will face a stronger 
competition from illegal loggers homologues. This will be felt more heavily in those countries 
sourcing their exports of paper and lumber to the EU. The case of Finland is emblematic. It 
experiences the major contraction in value-added (-162 US $ Million), production (-0.45% on 
average) and exports (-0.7% on average) as these are mainly addressed to the EU market where 
they have to compete with Russia, Estonia and Latvia which use illegal timber as intermediates
4. 
The US also export paper and lumber to the EU, but their market is wider and the effect on 
domestic paper and lumber sectors is negligible. 
Therefore, it can be added that  
conclusion 5: “the (unilateral) EU ban also has the effect of exposing secondary wood 
producers in legal logging countries to higher competition from secondary wood producers in 
illegal logging countries. This can be somewhat harmful for those legal logging countries 
sourcing a higher share of their secondary wood product exports to the EU.” 
 
4.3 Impacts on GDP 
 
Impacts on GDP are minimal (Figure 14), thus, it becomes difficult to explain them in detail. As 
a matter of fact, secondary and re-composition effects can prevail over direct effects, shadowing 
the role of typical market mechanisms. Three illegal logging regions: Myanmar, Estonia and 
Latvia, and Africa, can be seen as experiencing GDP losses. On the contrary, Russia, another 
illegal logger, performs better in term of GDP. Take this last example: Russia is not only 
gaining, but its gain is also the largest on a world level. However, as a result of the ban, its 
logging activity decreases by -3.1%; its logging exports by -9% and its terms of trade also 
worsen (-0.02%). The only positive notes for Russia are the slightly increased production and 
exports of lumber and paper (0.07%, 0.09% for production and 0.16%, 0.17% for exports 
respectively). These are not sufficient to justify the slight GDP gain. Marginal adjustments of 
demand and supply in all the other sectors can explain this. Could we thus conclude that the EU 
ban is beneficial for Russia? Mathematically yes, however, the right (and robust) message to 
derive from the whole exercise is that the EU ban has practically no effect on GDPs. Estonia 
and Latvia is the region worst off by a decrease of 0.02%. Thus, the ban is relevant and should 
be analyzed at the sectoral level. Given that the weight of logging activity is small if compared 
                                                 
4 Note incidentally that the decrease in lumber and paper industry value-added (-163 US$ Million) is smaller than the 
increase in the logging industry value- added (207 US$ Million).   23
to regional value-added, the feedback of shocks in the logging market onto the overall economic 
system are also small. Losses(gains) for the illegal(legal) logging sectors are thus dwarfed by 
demand, and supply adjustments occurring inside the remaining economic sectors. 
 












































Finally, this allows us to draw the following 
conclusion 6: “The effects of the (unilateral) EU ban are particularly relevant at the sectoral 
level, primarily in the logging industry. Outside of this sector effects are mainly distributional 
with scarce scale implications for the overall economic activity.” 
 
4.4 Impacts CO2 Emissions 
 
Given the characteristics of the ICES model, it is possible to identify not only the direct effects 
on forest carbon release associated with changes in logging activities, but also the overall 
change in carbon fluxes occurring on the rest of the economy due to the introduction of the ban. 
Table 8 presents the direct forest carbon release effects occurring on the logging sector, indirect 
carbon emissions and the resulting total effect. Globally, total reduction varies from 2500 to 600 
thousand tons of carbon depending on the assumption made regarding the amount of timber 
entering long term storage wood products. The reduction effect is the highest for Russia, 
followed by Africa and Brazil. Considering that 75% of harvested timber is used in long-term 
storage structures, illegal-logging–related emissions in Russia decrease by 300 thousand tons, 
while for Africa and Brazil emissions decrease by 115 and 95 thousand tons of carbon, 
respectively. Finally, it is worthwhile noting that while logging decreases in these countries, 
harvesting increases in other areas. These increases, however, take place in countries where   24
managed forests are responsible for almost all logging activities (United States of America, 
Canada and Finland), signifying that all eventually released carbon will be compensated by re-
plantation of previously cleared areas. 
We now turn our discussion to indirect carbon emissions. Given the limited size of the logging 
sector on the overall world economy production, global effects are relatively small.  World 
emissions increase by 62 thousand tons of carbon, offsetting the total reduction on forest related 
carbon emissions by 10% when we assume that 75% of illegally logged timber is used in long 
term storage structures. Interestingly enough, the European Union is the world region that 
increases its fuel related emissions. In particular, it is the logging sector within this region 
registering the highest increase. A similar effect is observed in Finland, even if its total level of 
emissions decreases after policy introduction. We may, therefore, conclude that while banning 
illegal logging may have a negative overall effect as global fuel emissions increase, it is not 
enough to reap the benefits from illegal logging forest carbon release reductions. 
Summarizing, we can derive that 
conclusion 7: “the effects of the (unilateral) EU ban on CO2 emissions is moderate if emissions 
from forestry are considered (-0.9%), it is negligible if total world CO2 emissions are the 
reference (-0.01%). However, in absolute terms, carbon saving can be from 2.4 to 0.57 million 
tons per year.” 
 
Table 8. CO2 emission effects (1000 tonnes) 
  Forest carbon emissions    Total change in emissions 
Change in emissions / 























Oceania -2,03 -0,51  1,22 -0,81 0,71 0,00% 0,00%
XAsia -38,83 -9,71  18,74 -20,09 9,03 0,00%  0,00%
Japan 0,00 0,00  9,49 9,49 9,49 0,00%  0,00%
China -21,19 -5,30  8,75 -12,43 3,45 0,00%  0,00%
Indonesia -51,63 -12,91  2,64 -49,00 -10,27 -0,05%  -0,01%
Myanmar -67,35 -16,84  0,70 -66,65 -16,14 -2,69%  -0,65%
Malaysia -13,34 -3,34  1,47 -11,87 -1,87 -0,03%  0,00%
India -6,22 -1,55  3,95 -2,27 2,39 0,00%  0,00%
CAN_XNA 0,00 0,00  2,55 2,55 2,55 0,00%  0,00%
USA 0,00 0,00  28,43 28,43 28,43 0,00%  0,00%
LACA -143,95 -35,99  2,58 -141,37 -33,41 -0,05%  -0,01%
Brazil -383,15 -95,79  2,13 -381,02 -93,66 -0,37%  -0,09%
EU 0,00 0,00  40,17 40,17 40,17 0,00%  0,00%
EST_LTV -70,33 -17,58  -4,40 -74,73 -21,98 -1,10%  -0,32%
Finland 0,00 0,00  -11,28 -11,28 -11,28 -0,05%  -0,05%
XEUR 0,00 0,00  11,50 11,50 11,50 0,00%  0,00%
Russia -1220,05 -305,01  -72,51 -1292,56 -377,52 -0,30%  -0,09%
AFRICA -461,02 -115,26  16,59 -444,43 -98,66 -0,17%  -0,04%
Total  -2479,08 -619,77 62,73 -2416,36 -557,05 -0,03%  -0,01%  25
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
This research analyzed the potential economic implication of a EU unilateral ban on imports of 
illegal logging within a general equilibrium perspective. The main messages to have emerged 
from this exercise are the following: 
-  the unilateral EU ban has the main effect of removing illegally logged timber from the 
international market. This is witnessed by the sharp export contractions from main illegal 
loggers (in a range from -8% to -40%). At the same time, it does not seem particularly 
effective in reducing illegal logging activities as in general, countries with illegal logging 
activities decline only moderately (-7% at most in Estonia and Latvia). Illegal logs are 
indeed partly re-addressed to importers, other than the EU, and used more in the domestic 
market. 
-  The unilateral EU ban has a (moderately) positive effect on logging industries in legal 
logging regions, as their production and value-added increase. The stronger positive effects 
are in the EU where log industry value-added increases by 584.6 US $ Million. Conversely, 
the ban damages logging industries in illegal logging regions, primarily those located in 
major log exporters to the EU i.e. Russia and Africa. These countries find it more difficult to 
internationally recompose their portfolio of customers. 
-  The unilateral EU ban primarily affects the logging sectors and the logging market. In 
general, the overall economic activity is not affected; impacts on GDP performances are 
negligible. Nonetheless, some interesting second-order effects can be seen in secondary 
wood products sectors. 
-  The unilateral EU ban indeed offers a more abundant and cheaper input (illegal timber 
which cannot be sold abroad) to secondary wood-products industries (lumber and paper) in 
illegal logging countries. Accordingly, their production increases and their exports become 
relatively more competitive and thus, also increase (0.9% at the maximum in Myanmar). 
Through this mechanism, part of the banned, illegal timber will re-enter the international 
trade flows, but will be “hidden” as processed wood. This effect is, however, limited. 
-  As a consequence the unilateral EU ban also has the effect to expose secondary wood 
producers in legal logging countries to higher competition from secondary wood producers 
in illegal logging countries. This can be somewhat harmful for those legal logging countries 
(e.g. Finland) sourcing a higher share of their secondary wood product exports to the EU.   26
-  Given the limited effect on overall economic activity, effects on GHG emissions are also 
limited. Direct carbon emissions from logging activity can decrease from 2.5 to 0.6 million 
tons per year, however this is a tiny advantage (a reduction of the -0.01%) if compared to 
world CO2 emissions. 
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Annex I: The ICES model description 
 
ICES (Intertemporal Computable Equilibrium System)  is a CGE model for the world economy. 
Its general equilibrium structure - in which all markets are interlinked - is tailored to capture and 
highlight the production and consumption substitution processes at play in the social-economic 
system as a response economic shocks. In doing so, the final equilibrium determined, takes 
explicitly “market-driven adaptation” of economic systems into account.  
ICES is a recursive-dynamic CGE that shares the production structure of GTAP-E model 
(Burniaux and Truong, 2002) using data for the year 2004 available from the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) database version 7 (Narayanan B.G. and Walmsley T.L., 2008).  
Since the aim of this particular exercise is to highlight transmission mechanisms and possible 
feedback effects from a import ban, rather than to study long-term dynamics, we use it in its static 
fashion relying on the detailed information resulting from simulations for the calibration year 
(2004). 
The main features of the model are:  
•  Top-down recursive growth model: a sequence of static equilibria are inter-temporally 
connected by endogenous investment decisions  
•  Detailed regional and sectoral disaggregation.  
•  Inter sectoral factor mobility and international trade. International investment flows.  
•  Representation of emissions of main GHG gases: CO2, CH4, N2O.  
 
As in all CGE models, ICES makes use of the Walrasian perfect competition paradigm to 
simulate adjustment processes, although the inclusion of some elements of imperfect competition 
is also possible.      
Industries are modelled through a representative firm, minimizing costs while taking prices as 
given. In turn, output prices are given by average production costs. The production functions are 
specified via a series of nested CES functions. Domestic and foreign inputs are not perfect 
substitutes, according to the so-called “Armington” assumption (Figure A1). 
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Figure A1. Nested tree structure for industrial production processes 
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A representative consumer in each region receives income, defined as the service value of 
national primary factors (natural resources, land, labour, capital). Capital and labour are perfectly 
mobile domestically but immobile internationally. Land and natural resources, on the other hand, 
are industry-specific. 
This income is used to finance three classes of expenditure: aggregate household consumption, 
public consumption and savings. The expenditure shares are generally fixed, which amounts to 
saying that the top-level utility function has a Cobb-Douglas specification. 
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Public consumption is split in a series of alternative consumption items, again according to a 
Cobb-Douglas specification. However, almost all expenditure is actually concentrated in one 
specific industry: Non-market Services. 
Private consumption is analogously split in a series of alternative composite Armington 
aggregates. However, the functional specification used at this level is the Constant Difference in 
Elasticities form: a non-homothetic function, which is used to account for possible differences in 
income elasticities for the various consumption goods. 
 
Investment is internationally mobile: savings from all regions are pooled and then investment is 
allocated so as to achieve equality of expected rates of return to capital. 
In this way, savings and investments are equalized at the world, but not at the regional level. 
Because of accounting identities, any financial imbalance mirrors a trade deficit or surplus in each 
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